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Abstract
In this paper stochastic dynamic programming is used to investigate habitat conservation by a mul-
titude of landholders under uncertainty about the value of environmental services and irreversible de-
velopment. We study land conversion under competition on the market for agricultural products when
voluntary and mandatory measures are combined by the Government to induce adequate participation in
a conservation plan. We analytically determine the impact of uncertainty and optimal policy conversion
dynamics and discuss di⁄erent policy scenarios on the basis of the relative long-run expected rate of
deforestation. Finally, some numerical simulations are provided to illustrate our ￿ndings.
keywords: optimal stopping, deforestation, payments for environmental services, Natural
Resources Management.
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1 Introduction
As human population grows, the human-Nature con￿ ict has become more severe and natural habitats are
more exposed to conversion. On the one hand, clearing land to develop it may lead to the irreversible
reduction or loss of valuable environmental services (hereafter, ES) such as biodiversity conservation, carbon
sequestration, watershed control and provision of scenic beauty for recreational activities and ecotourism.
On the other hand, conserving land in its pristine state has a cost opportunity in terms of foregone pro￿ts
from economic activities (e.g. agriculture, commercial forestry) which can be undertaken once land has been
cleared.
By balancing marginal social bene￿t and cost of conservation, the social planner is required to destine
the available land to conservation or development which are usually two competing and mutually exclusive
uses. Despite its theoretical appeal, the idea of a social planner who, having de￿ned a socially optimal
habitat conversion rule, can implement it by simply commanding the constitution of protected areas, is far
from reality. In fact, since the majority of remaining ecosystems are on land privately owned, the economic
and political cost of such intervention would make the adoption of command mechanisms by Governments
unlikely (Langpap and Wu, 2004; Sierra and Russman, 2006). In addition, as pointed out by Folke et
al.(1996, p. 1019), "keeping humans out of nature through a protected-area strategy may buy time, but it
does not address the factors in society driving the loss of biodiversity". In other words, protecting natural
ecosystems through natural reserves and other protected areas may be a signi￿cant step in the short-run to
deal with severe and immediate threats but it still does not create the structure of incentives able to mitigate
the con￿ ict human-Nature in the long-run.
At least initially, Governments favoured an indirect approach in conservation policies. The main idea
behind this approach was to divert, through programs such as integrated conservation and development
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1projects, community-based natural resource management or other environment-friendly commercial ven-
tures, the allocation of labour and capital from ecosystem damaging activities toward ecosystem conserving
activities (Wells et al., 1992; Ferraro and Simpson, 2002). However, despite the initial enthusiasm, e⁄ec-
tiveness and cost-e¢ ciency concerns have led to abandonment of this approach in favour of compensations
to be paid directly to the landholders providing conservation services (see e.g. Ferraro, 2001; Ferraro and
Kiss, 2002; Ferraro and Simpson, 2005). A direct approach, mainly represented by schemes like Payments
for environmental services (hereafter, PES) has become increasingly common in both developed and devel-
oping countries. Under a PES program, a provider delivers to a buyer a well-de￿ned ES (or corresponding
land use) in exchange for an agreed payment.1 Unfortunately, also the e¢ cacy of PES programs has been
questioned since their performance has not always met the established conservation targets.2 In particular,
lack of additionality in the conservation e⁄orts induced by the programs has often been suspected.3 In other
words, it seems that in practice landholders have been practically paid for conserving the same extent of land
they would have conserved without the program. Considering the limited amount of money for conservation
initiatives and the perverse e⁄ect that wasting it may have on future funding, further research is needed to
increase our understanding of the economic agent￿ s conversion decision.
The literature investigating optimal conservation decisions under irreversibility and uncertainty over the
net bene￿ts attached to conservation represents a signi￿cant branch of environmental and resource economics
(Bulte et al., 2002, Kassar and Lassere, 2004; Leroux et al., 2009). A unifying aspect in this literature is the
stress on the e⁄ect that irreversibility and uncertainty have on decision making. In fact, since irreversible
conversion under uncertainty over future prospects may be later regretted, this decision may be postponed
to bene￿t from option value attached to the maintained ￿ exibility (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Pioneer papers
such as Arrow and Fisher (1974) and Henry (1974) have been followed by several other contributions which
have improved the modelling e⁄ort and solved the technical problems posed by increasingly complex model
set-up.4 Two contributions close to ours are Bulte et al. (2002) and Leroux et al. (2009). In the ￿rst paper,
the authors determine the optimal forest stock to be held by trading o⁄pro￿t from agriculture and the value
of ES attached to forest conservation. Their analysis highlights the value of the option to postpone land
clearing under irreversibility of environmental impact and uncertainty about conservation bene￿ts. A similar
problem is solved in Leroux et al. (2009) where, unlike the previous paper, the authors allow for ecological
feedback and consider its impact both on the expected trend and volatility of ES value.
Both papers, however, by solving the allocative problem from a central planner perspective, miss the
complexity of challenges characterizing conservation policies and the role that competition on markets for
agricultural products may have on conversion decisions.
In this paper, we aim to investigate these issues by modelling conversion decisions in a decentralized
economy populated by a multitude of homogenous landholders and where the Government has introduced
a payment scheme for conservation. Each landholder manages a portion of total available land and may
conserve or develop it by a⁄ording some conversion cost. If land is conserved, ES have a value proportional
to the area conserved which randomly ￿ uctuates following a geometric Brownian motion. If the parcel is
developed, land enters as an input into the production of goods or services (co⁄ee, rubber, soy, palm oil,
timber, biofuels, cattle, etc.) and the farmer must compete with other farmers on the market. In this
context, the Government introduces a land use policy which aims to balance conservation and development.
The policy is based on a PES scheme implemented through a conservation contract establishing di⁄erent
requirements and payments before and after land conversion has occurred. In particular, if the entire plot is
conserved, then the landholder receives a certain payment whereas if he/she decides to clear it, then he/she
must set aside the portion indicated in the contract (i.e. the plot may be only partially developed) and
receives a di⁄erent payment. Finally, we also consider the possibility that the Government may impose a
1In this respect we follow Wunder (2005, p. 3) where a PES is de￿ned as "(i) a voluntary transaction where (ii) a well-de￿ned
ES (or a land-use likely to secure that service) (iii) is being "bought" by a (minimum one) ES buyer (iv) from a (minimum one)
ES provider (v) if and only if the ES provider secures ES provision (conditionality)".
2As reported by Ferraro (2001), this may be due to several reasons such as lack of funding, failures in institutional design,
poor de￿nition and weak enforcement of property rights and strategic behaviour by potential ES providers. See Ferraro (2008)
on information failures and Smith and Shogren (2002) on speci￿c contract design issues.
3We refer in particular to government-￿nanced programs. On the performance of user vs. government-￿nanced interventions
see Pagiola (2008) on PSA program in Costa Rica and Wunder et al. (2008) for a comparative analysis of PES programs
in developed and developing countries. See Ferraro and Pattanayak (2006) for a call on empirical monitoring of conservation
programs.
4Among them, see for instance Conrad (1980), Clarke and Reed (1989), Reed (1993), Conrad (1997), Conrad (2000).
2limit on the total forested land which can be cleared.
Under this conservation program we solve for the conversion path taking a real option approach but
unlike from previous literature we internalize the role of market entry dynamics. It follows that under
competition the conversion path must be determined on the basis of a long-run zero pro￿t condition. In
this respect, it becomes interesting to study the impact that di⁄erent payment scheme may have on the
conversion dynamic. We then allow for two di⁄erent PES schemes. Under the ￿rst one, the payment rate
for land unit is more generous when the entire plot is conserved while in the second scheme the opposite is
proposed. Both situations may arise in reality, re￿ ecting di⁄erent sensitivity towards conservation or, more
practically, the way Governments try to adapt to the economic and political framework they face.5
Under both schemes, we are able to determine analytically the optimal conversion rules. Not surprisingly,
conversion is postponed if landholders conserving the entire plot receive a higher payment. This is due to
the higher cost opportunity of conversion which is higher since it includes the payments implicitly given
up converting. Interestingly, we show that, as suggested by Ferraro (2001), a landholder may conserve the
entire plot even if partially compensated for the provided ES. Moreover, under this payment design, only
progressive reductions in the payments trigger land clearing and, at the end, landholders may clear a surface
smaller than the one targeted by the Government. With the second payment design, i.e. higher transfer if
land is developed, the structure of incentives is reversed and an implicit bias toward conversion is introduced.
An important mass of landholders rapidly convert land till the last plot where pro￿t from agriculture covers
the conversion cost while the rest prefers to wait and clear the plots only if payments rise. Under both
PES designs, we note that, by setting a limit to the land surface that landholders may develop together, the
Government may induce rush in the conversion dynamics.6 In fact, landholders, fearing a restriction in the
exercise of the option to convert, may start a conversion run which rapidly exhausts the entire forest stock
up to the ￿xed limit.7
Finally, to assess the temporal performance of the optimal conservation policy and study the impact of
increasing uncertainty about future environmental bene￿ts on conversion speed, we rearrange the optimal
conversion rules in the form of regulated processes (Harrison, 1985, chp. 2) and derive the long-run average
growth rate of deforestation. Hence, under di⁄erent policy scenarios, we use the rate of deforestation to
rank di⁄erent policies on the basis of current optimal forest stock and expected total conversion time.
Interestingly, we show that uncertainty about payments, even if it induces conversion postponement in the
short-run, reduces expected time for total conversion in the long run.
We then use it to illustrate, through several numerical simulations, optimal forest conversion in Costa
Rica.8 We ￿nd that when landholders conserving the whole plot are o⁄ered a higher payment with respect to
the ones developing, then higher uncertainty over payments increases the long-run average rate of conversion.
The opposite occurs when the policy rewards more generously farmers conserving only a portion of their
plot.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the basic set-up for the model is
presented. In Section 3 we study the equilibrium in the conversion strategies under two policy scenarios. In
Section 4, we discuss issues related to the PES voluntary participation and contract enforceability. Section
5 is devoted to the derivation of the long-run average rate of conversion. In Section 6 we illustrate our main
￿ndings through numerical exercises. Section 7 concludes.
5For instance, if forest conservation does not qualify under the CDM (Clean Development Mechanism) while reforestation
does, then it may be plausible for a Government to push towards timber harvest and subsequent reforestation on some land in
order to cash funding on carbon markets and ￿nance conservation on the remaining habitat. Note that this was actually the
case in the ￿rst commitment period (2008-2012) (IPCC, 2007).
6In Australia, the Productivity Commission reports evidence of pre-emptive clearing due to the introduction of clearing
restrictions (Productivity Commission, 2004). On unintended impacts of public policy see for instance Stavins and Ja⁄e (1990)
showing that, despite an explicit federal conservation policy, 30% of forested wetland conversion in the Mississippi Valley has
been induced by federal ￿ood-control projects. In this respect, see also M￿stad (2001) showing how timber trade restrictions
may induce an increase in logging.
7A similar e⁄ect has been ￿rstly noted by Bartolini (1993). In this paper, the author studies decentralized investment decision
in a market where a limit on aggregate investment is present.
8Unlike Leroux et al. (2009) who exogenously assume a maximum annual conversion rate (2.5% in the case of Costa Rica
forests), we calculate it optimally on the basis of land currently converted and information on current and future payments.
32 A Dynamic Model of Land Conversion
Consider a country where at time period t = 0 the total land available, L, is allocated as follows:
L = A0 + F (1)
where A0 is the surface cultivated and F is the portion still in its pristine natural state covered by primary
forest.9 Assume that F is divided into small and homogenous parcels of equal extent held by a multitude of
identical risk-neutral agents.10 By normalizing such extent to 1 hectare, F denotes also the number of agents
in the economy.11 Natural habitats provide valuable environmental goods and services at each time period
t.12 Let B(t) represent the per-parcel value of such goods and services and assume it randomly ￿ uctuates
according to the following geometric Brownian motion:
dB(t)
B(t)
= ￿dt + ￿dz(t); with B(0) = B (2)
where ￿ and ￿ are respectively the drift and the volatility parameters, and dz(t) is the increment of a Wiener
process.13
At each t, two competitive and mutually exclusive destinations may be given to forested land: conservation
or irreversible development. Once the plot is cleared, the landholder becomes a farmer using land as an input
for agricultural production (or commercial forestry).14
2.1 The Government
To induce conservation the Government o⁄ers to each agent a contract to be accepted on a voluntary basis.
A compensation equal to ￿1B(t) with ￿1 2 [0;1] is paid at each time period t if the entire plot is conserved.15
On the contrary, if the landholder aims to develop his/her parcel, a restriction is imposed in that a portion
of the total surface, 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, must be conserved.16 In this case, a payment equal to ￿￿2B(t) with
￿2 2 [0;1] may be o⁄ered to compensate the landholder.17 Since ES usually have the nature of public good,
payment rates, ￿1 and ￿2, may be interpreted as the levels of appropriability that the society is willing to
9As in Bulte et al. (2002) A0 may represent the best land which has been converted to agriculture.
10At the moment for the sake of generality we refer to landholders. Later we will discuss the implications of our model with
respect to property rights issues.
11None of our results relies on this assumption. In fact, provided that no single agent has signi￿cant market power, we can
obtain identical results by allowing each agent to own more than one unit of land. See e.g. Baldursson (1998) and Grenadier
(2002).
12They may include biodiversity conservation, carbon sequestration, watershed control, provision of scenic beauty for recre-
ational activities and ecotourism, timber and non-timber forest products. See e.g. Conrad (1997), Conrad (2000), Clarke and
Reed (1989), Reed (1993), Bulte et al. (2002).
13The Brownian motion in (2) is a reasonable approximation for conservation bene￿ts and we share this assumption with
most of the existing literature. Conrad (1997, p. 98) considers a geometric Brownian motion for the amenity value as a plausible
assumption to capture uncertainty over individual preferences for amenity. Bulte et al. (2002, p.152) point out that "parameter
￿ can be positive (e.g., re￿ecting an increasingly important carbon sink function as atmospheric CO2 concentration rises), but
it may also be negative (say, due to improvements in combinatorial chemistry that lead to a reduced need for primary genetic
material)". However, this assumption neglects the direct feedback e⁄ect that conversion decisions may have on the stochastic
process illustrating the dynamic of conservation bene￿ts. See Leroux et al. (2009) for a model where such e⁄ect is accounted
by letting conservation bene￿ts follow a controlled di⁄usion process with both drift and volatility depending on the conversion
path.
14In the following, "landholder" refers to an agent conserving land and "farmer" to an agent cultivating it.
15As pointed out by Engel et al. (2008), by internalizing external non-market values from conservation, PES schemes have
attracted increasing interest as mechanisms to induce the provision of ES.
16Note that our analysis is general enough to include also the case where ￿ is not imposed but is endogenously set by each
landholder. In fact, due for instance to ￿nancial constraints limiting the extent of the development project, the landholders
may ￿nd optimal not to convert the entire plot.
17Note that our contract scheme is in line with Ferraro (2001, p. 997) where the author states that conservation practitioners
"may also ￿nd that they do not need to make payments for an entire targeted ecosystem to achieve their objectives. They
need to include only "just enough" of the ecosystem to make it unlikely, given current economic conditions, infrastructure, and
enforcement levels, that anyone would convert the remaining area to other uses". In addition, taking a di⁄erent perspective,
our framework seems supported also by wildlife protection programs which rarely pay farmers more than a fraction of the losses
due to wildlife (See Rondeau and Bulte, 2007).
4guarantee on the value generated by conserving, i.e. B(t) and ￿B(t) respectively.18 In addition, besides ￿ the
Government ￿xes an upper level ￿ A on total land conversion. This limit may preclude land development for
some landholders. The number of landholders for whom conserving the entire plot may become compulsory
depends on the magnitude of ￿. In fact, note that ￿ may be low enough to allow every landholder to
clear land. However, the de￿nition of ￿ does not need to meet such requirement since other issues may be
prioritized, i.e. habitat fragmentation, critical ecological thresholds, enforcement and transaction costs for
the program implementation, etc. Thus, denoting by ￿ N =
￿ A
1￿￿ the number of potential farmers involved in
the conversion process, we assume ￿ N ￿ F.
Figure 1: Land conversion with bu⁄er areas
Our framework is general enough to include di⁄erent conservation targets such as old-growth forests or habitat
surrounding wetlands, marshes, lagoons or by the marine coastline and meet several spatial requirements.
For instance, the conservation target may be represented by an area divided into homogenous parcels running
along a river or around a lake or a lagoon where, to maintain a signi￿cant provision of ecosystem services,
a portion of each parcel must be conserved (see ￿gure 1). As stressed by the literature in spatial ecology,
the creation of bu⁄er areas, by managing the proximity of human economic activities, is crucial since it
guarantees the e¢ ciency of conservation measures in the targeted areas.19 In this case the conservation
program may be induced by implementing a payment contract schedule di⁄erentiating for the state of land
i.e. totally conserved vs. developed within the restriction enforced through environmental law. However,
we are also able to consider the opposite case where the landholder may totally develop his/her plot but an
upper limit is ￿xed on the total extent of land which can be cleared in the region.20
2.2 The Landholders
Developing the parcel is an irreversible action which has a sunk cost, (1￿￿)c, including cost for clearing and
settling land for agriculture.21 Denoting by A(t) the total land developed at time t, the number of farmers
18As ￿1 and ￿2 are constant, payments also follow a geometric Brownian motion (easily derivable from (2)). However, this
is di⁄erent from the way payments are modelled in Isik and Yang (2004) where they also depend on the ￿uctuations in the
conservation cost opportunity (pro￿t from agriculture, changes in environmental policy, etc.).
19See for instance Hansen and Rotella (2002) and Hansen and DeFries (2007).
20This could be the case for an area covered by a tropical forest (Bulte et al., 2002; Leroux et al., 2009), or a protected area
where farmers located next to the site may sustainably extract natural resources (Tisdell, 1995; Wells et al., 1992).
21Bulte et al., (2002, p. 152) de￿ne c as "the marginal land conversion cost". It "may be negative if there is a positive
one-time net bene￿t from logging the site that exceeds the costs of preparing the harvested site for crop production". We also
5must be equal to N(t) =
A(t)
1￿￿ and since 1 ￿ ￿ is ￿xed, the conversion dynamic must mirror the variation in
the number of farmers, i.e. dN(t) =
dA(t)
1￿￿ . Therefore, assuming that the extent of each plot is small enough
to exclude any potential price-making consideration, we may use either N(t) or A(t) when evaluating the
individual decision process.22 Competition on the market for agricultural products implies that at each time
period t the optimal number of farmers (or the optimal total land developed) is determined by the entry
zero pro￿t condition. In addition, since the per-parcel value of services, B(t), makes all agents symmetric,
some random mechanism must be used to select which landholder develops ￿rst.
We assume a constant elasticity demand function for agricultural products. Since supply depends on the
surface cultivated, then let demand be speci￿ed as PA(t) = ￿A(t)￿￿ with A(0) = A0(> 1), where ￿ is a
parameter illustrating di⁄erent positions of the demand and ￿￿ is the inverse of the demand elasticity.
Now, let￿ s solve for the conversion process taking ￿1, ￿2 and ￿ as exogenously given parameters. Denoting
by PA(t) the marginal return as land is cleared over time, the farmer instantaneous pro￿t function is given
by:
￿(A(t);B(t); ￿ A) = (1 ￿ ￿)PA(t) + ￿￿2B(t) (3)


















where r is the constant risk-free interest rate,24 ￿￿(A(t);B(t); ￿ A)=(1 ￿ ￿)PA(t) + (￿￿2 ￿ ￿1)B(t) and t is
the stochastic conversion time.25
In (4) the ￿rst term represents the perpetuity paid by the Government if the parcel is conserved forever,
while the second term represents the extra pro￿t that each landholder may expect if she/he clears the land
and becomes a farmer. The extra pro￿t is, given by the crop yield sold on the market plus the di⁄erence
in the payments received by the Government. As soon as the excess pro￿t from land development equals
the deforestation cost the landholder may clear the parcel. This implies that the optimal conversion timing
depends only on the second term in (4).
assume, without loss of generality, that the conversion cost is proportional to the surface cleared.
22To consider in￿nitesimally small agents is a standard assumption in in￿nite horizon models investigating dynamic industry
equilibrium under competition. See for instance Jovanovic (1982), Dixit (1989), Hopenhayn (1992), Lambson (1992), Dixit and
Pindyck (1994, chp. 8), Bartolini (1993), Caballero and Pindyck (1996), Dosi and Moretto (1992) and Moretto (2008).
23See Harrison (1985, p. 44).
24The introduction of risk aversion does not change the results since the analysis can be developed under a risk-neutral
probability measure for B(t). See Cox and Ross (1976) for further details.
25Note that the expected value is taken accounting for A(t) increasing over time as land is cleared.
63 The Competitive Equilibrium
Denote by V (A(t);B(t); ￿ A) the value function of an in￿nitely living farmer.26 By (4), the optimal conversion
time, ￿, solves the following maximization problem:27





￿￿(A;B; ￿ A)e￿rtdt ￿ I[t=￿](1 ￿ ￿)c
￿
(5)
where I[t=￿] is an indicator function and the expectation is taken considering that the total land developed
A may vary over time. The indicator function states that, due to competition among farmers on the market,
at the time of conversion the value from converting land must equal the cost of land clearing. In the real
option literature the problem we must solve is referred to as "optimal stopping" (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
The idea is that at any point in time the value of immediate investment (stopping) is compared with the
expected value of waiting dt (continuation), given the information available at that point in time (the value
of the stochastic variable B and the stock of land developed, A) and the knowledge of the two processes. If
the initial size of the active farmers is A ￿ A0, we expect the converting process to work as follows: for a
￿xed number of farmers, pro￿ts in (3) move stochastically driven by B. As soon as the per-parcel value of
ES reaches a critical level, say BC, development (i.e. entry into the agricultural market) becomes feasible.
This implies an increase, dA, in cultivated land and a drop in revenues from agriculture along the function
PA(A). The value of services will then continue to move stochastically until the next entry occurs.
In this setting the (competitive) equilibrium bounding the pro￿t process for each farmer can be con-
structed as a symmetric Nash equilibrium in entry strategies. By the in￿nite divisibility of F, the equilib-
rium can be determined by simply looking at the single landholder clearing policy which is de￿ned ignoring
the competitors￿entry decisions (see Leahy 1993). Consider a short interval dt where any conversion takes
place. Over this interval A is constant and the farmer holds an asset paying ￿￿(A;B; ￿ A)dt as cash ￿ ow and
E[dV (A;B; ￿ A)] as capital gain. If the farmer is active then the cash ￿ ow and the expected capital gain must
equal the normal return, that is rV (A;B; ￿ A)]dt = ￿￿(A;B; ￿ A)dt + E[dV (A;B; ￿ A)].
Let V (A;B; ￿ A) be twice-di⁄erentiable in B, and expand dV (A;B; ￿ A) using Ito￿ s Lemma. Then, in the




￿2B2VBB(A;B; ￿ A) + ￿BVB(A;B; ￿ A) ￿ rV (A;B; ￿ A)+ (6)
+
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿A￿￿ + (￿￿2 ￿ ￿1)B
￿
= 0
This is an ordinary di⁄erential equation since the number of farmers is constant. Using standard arguments
the general solution is (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994):
V (A;B; ￿ A) = Z1(A)B￿1 + Z2(A)B￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿A￿￿
r




where 1 < ￿1 < r=￿, ￿2 < 0 are the roots of the characteristic equation Q(￿) = 1
2￿2￿(￿￿1)+￿￿￿r = 0 and
Z1, Z2 are two constants to be determined.
3.1 Case with ￿1 > ￿￿2
Suppose that a lower payment is o⁄ered for conservation once land is converted, i.e. ￿1 > ￿￿2.28 To
determine the optimal conversion threshold, BC(A) = B￿(A), the landholder must consider bene￿ts and
costs attached to conversion. According to (7), the pro￿t accruing from the crop yield, (1 ￿ ￿)￿A
￿￿
r , is
counterbalanced by the di⁄erence in the payments, (￿￿2 ￿ ￿1) B
r￿￿, received for conservation. In addition,
note that as landholders convert land and become farmers pro￿t from agriculture decreases. This negative
26As we show in the appendix, the problem can be equivalently solved considering a landholder evaluating the option to
develop.
27In the following we will drop the time subscript for notational convenience.
28Note that this may occur even if ￿1 < ￿2; i.e. the payment rate per unit of land conserved is more generous when a portion
of the plot has been developed. We will discuss this case in greater detail in the next section.
7e⁄ect on the value of converted land is accounted for in (7) by the second term (Z2(A) ￿ 0 for A ￿ ￿ A). In
fact, since ￿1 > ￿￿2 then only an expected reduction in B can induce conversion. This implies that to keep
V (A;B; ￿ A) ￿nite we must drop the ￿rst term by setting Z1 = 0, i.e. limB!1 V (A,B; ￿ A) = 0. Hence, (7)
reduces to:
V (A;B; ￿ A) = Z2(A)B￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿A￿￿
r




To determine Z2(A) and B￿(A) some suitable boundary conditions on (8) are required. First, development
by increasing the number of competing farmers in the market keeps the value of being an active farmer
below (1 ￿ ￿)c. Second, marginal rents for an active farmer must be null B￿(A). These considerations can
be formalized by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Provided that each agent rationally forecasts the future dynamics of the market for agricul-
tural goods for land to be converted the following condition must hold
V (A;B￿(A); ￿ A) = (1 ￿ ￿)c (9)
where the conversion rule is
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where ￿ = 1￿￿
￿1￿￿￿2, ^ A = ( ￿







Proof. See appendix A.1.
For conversion to be optimal, the dynamic zero pro￿t condition in (9) must hold at the threshold, B￿(A).
Let￿ s analyse such condition by rearranging (9) as follows:
Z2(A)B￿(A)






= (1 ￿ ￿)c + ￿1
B￿(A)
r ￿ ￿
This means that bene￿ts from clearing land and becoming a farmer must match the cost opportunity of
conversion, i.e. the cost for clearing and settling land plus the payment perpetuity which is implicitly given
up by converting.
By Proposition 1 the whole conversion dynamics are characterized in terms of B. Since the agent￿ s size
is in￿nitesimal, the trigger B￿(A) must be a decreasing function of A. In both ￿gure 2 and 3, conservation
is optimal in the region above the curve. In fact, in this region, B is high enough to deter conversion and
each landholder conserves up to the time where B driven by (2) drops to B￿(A). Then, as B crosses B￿(A)
from above, a discrete mass of landholders will enter the agricultural market developing (part of ) their land.
Since higher competition reduces pro￿ts from agriculture, entries take place until conditions for conservation
are restored (B > B￿(A)).
8Depending on ￿ A, we obtain two di⁄erent scenarios (see ￿gure 2 and 3):
(1) if ^ A ￿ ￿ A, the conversion process stops at ^ A since this is the last parcel for which conversion makes
economic sense (￿
r ^ A￿￿ ￿c = 0). This in turn implies that the surface, ￿ A￿ ^ A ￿ 0, is conserved forever
at a total cost equal to ￿1
B
r￿￿( ￿ A ￿ ^ A).
Figure 2: Optimal conversion threshold with ￿1 > ￿￿2 and ^ A ￿ ￿ A
(2) if ^ A > ￿ A, land is converted smoothly up to A+ following the curve (10 bis(a)). If the surface of cultivated
land falls within the interval A+ ￿ A ￿ ￿ A, when B hits the threshold B￿(A), the landholders start
a run for conversion up to ￿ A. Unlike the previous case, here the limit imposed by the Government
binds and restricts conversion on a surface, ￿ A￿ ^ A > 0, where development would be pro￿table from the
landholder￿ s viewpoint. The intuition behind this result is immediate if we take a backward perspective.
When the limit imposed by the Government ￿ A is reached, then it must be Z2( ￿ A) = 0 since no market
entry may occur. Hence, condition (9) reduces to V ( ￿ A;B￿( ￿ A); ￿ A)=(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ A
￿￿




(1 ￿ ￿)c from which we obtain (10bis (b)) as optimal trigger. This implies that at ￿ A marginal rents
induced by future reduction in B are not null, i.e. VB( ￿ A;B; ￿ A) < 0, and they would be entirely captured
by market incumbents. Since each single landholder realizes the bene￿t from marginally anticipating his
entry decision, then an entry run occurs to avoid the restriction imposed by the Government. However,
by rushing, the rent attached to information on market pro￿tability, collectable by waiting, vanishes.
Therefore there will be a land extent (i.e. a number of farmers), A+ < ￿ A, such that for A < A+ no
landholder ￿nds it convenient to rush since the marginal advantages from a future reduction in B are
lower than the option value lost.29 Note also that, as A+ is given by B￿(A+) = B￿( ￿ A), the threshold
29This means the A+th is the last landholder for whom VB(A+;B￿(A+); ￿ A) = 0:
9in (10bis), triggering the run, results in the traditional NPV break-even rule (see Appendix A.1).30
Figure 3: Optimal conversion threshold with ￿1 > ￿￿2 and ^ A > ￿ A
A useful and interesting feature of the conversion rule in (10) is that by setting ￿1 = 1; ￿2 = 0 and ￿ = 0
then ￿ = 1 and (10) collapses into the conversion strategy of the social planner in Bulte et al. (2002). In
our model, it is immediate to show that several combinations of the second-best tools ￿1; ￿2 and ￿ result in
￿ = 1 and lead to a ￿rst-best conversion strategy.31
￿ c r ￿
> 0 < 0 < 0 < 0
Table 1: Comparative statics on ^ A
As shown in table 1 the de￿nition of the last plot, ^ A, which is worth converting, depends on parameters
regulating the demand for agricultural goods, the interest rate and the land unit conversion cost. A higher
￿ illustrating a higher demand for agricultural products and/or a more rigid demand moves ^ A forward since
higher pro￿ts support the conversion for a larger land surface. Similarly, as c ! 0, all the available land will
be cultivated ( ^ A ! ￿ A). With a higher r future returns from agriculture become relatively lower with respect
to the cost of clearing land and land conversion is less attractive.
￿ c r ￿
￿ 0 ￿ 0 ￿ 0 ￿ 0
￿ ￿2 ￿1 ￿2 ￿







Table 2: Comparative statics on B￿(A)
30In Bartolini (1993) a similar result is obtained. Under linear adjustment costs and stochastic returns, investment cost is
constant up to the investment limit where it becomes in￿nite. As a reaction to this external e⁄ect, recurrent runs may occur
under competition as aggregate investment approaches the ceiling. See also Moretto (2008).
31In other words, a competitive equilibrium evolves as maximizing solution for the expected present value of social welfare in
the form of consumer surplus (Lucas and Prescott, 1971; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, ch.9).
10In table 2, we provide some comparative statics illustrating the e⁄ect that changes in the exogenous pa-
rameters have on the threshold level B￿(A). Changes in an exogenous parameter, whenever increasing
(decreasing) conversion bene￿ts with respect to conservation bene￿ts, rede￿ne, by moving upward (down-
ward) the boundary B￿(A), the conversion and conservation regions. In this light, for instance, to a higher
￿ corresponds higher pro￿ts from agriculture and thus a higher B￿(A) and a larger conversion region. The
same e⁄ect is also produced by a relatively more inelastic demand. On the contrary, the opposite occurs as
c increases since a higher conversion cost decreases net conversion bene￿ts.With an increase in the interest
rate, exercise of the option to convert should be anticipated but this e⁄ect is too weak to prevail over the
e⁄ect that a higher r has on the cost opportunity of conversion. Studying the e⁄ect of volatility, ￿, and
of growth parameter, ￿, the sign of the derivatives is in line with the standard insight in the real options
literature. An increase in the growth rate and volatility of B determines postponed exercise of the option
to convert. This can be explained by the need to reduce the regret of taking an irreversible decision under
uncertainty. Since the cost of this decision is growing at a faster rate and there is uncertainty about its
magnitude, waiting to collect information about future prospects is a sensible strategy.
As expected, an increase in ￿1 pushes the barrier downward since it makes it more pro￿table to conserve
the plot and keep open the option to convert. In line with this result, the barrier responds in the opposite
way to an increase in ￿2 which implicitly provides an incentive to conversion. Changes in ￿ have a non-
monotonic e⁄ect on the barrier which depends on the ratio between the two payment rates. A higher ￿
de￿nes a stricter requirement on development that may push the barrier downward for two reasons. First,
a lower return from agriculture since less land is cultivated which is, however, balanced by a lower cost for
clearing land, and second, as
￿1
￿2 > 1 a higher payment on the marginal unit which the farmer is required to
set aside is guaranteed if the plot is totally conserved. The case where
￿1
￿2 ￿ 1 and the barrier shifts upward
can be easily explained by inverting the second argument.
These considerations mostly hold for both (10) and (10 bis). Clearly, over the interval A+ < A ￿ ￿ A since
the option multiple,
￿2
￿2￿1, drops out, the barrier B￿(A) is not a⁄ected by ￿. The derivative with respect to





> 0 for r < ￿(
^ A
￿ A)￿
￿ 0 for r ￿ ￿(
^ A
￿ A)￿ for A+ < A ￿ ￿ A
Finally, since by (10bis) the same level of B triggers the entry of a positive mass of landholders, i.e. B￿(A+) =
B￿( ￿ A), it is worth highlighting that the surface triggering a conversion rush is independent of the de￿nition
of ￿1, ￿2 and ￿. The Government policy may either speed up or slow down the conversion dynamic but
it cannot alter A+ which depends only on the choice of ￿ A with respect to ^ A. Note that @A
+
@ ￿ A > 0 which
reasonably means that as ￿ A ! ^ A the run would be triggered only by a relatively a lower level for B. In other
words, since in expected terms a higher ￿ A implies a less strict threat of being regulated, then landholders are
not willing to give up information rents collectable by waiting. Not surprisingly, @A
+
@ ^ A < 0. A lower ^ A implies
a faster drop in the pro￿t from agriculture as A increases and then a lower incentive for the conversion run.
3.2 Case with ￿1 < ￿￿2
Now, assume that ￿1 < ￿￿2. In this case ￿2 > ￿1 will necessarily obtain, that is, the payment rate per unit of
land conserved is more generous when a portion of the plot has been developed. This could be the case for a
Government which, having run out of funding for the conservation program, may be willing to sacri￿ce some
pristine habitat in order to more generously ￿nance conservation on a smaller scale.32 Di⁄erently, this choice
may also be reasonably explained by a Government wishing to indirectly induce a switch towards certain
agricultural or forestry practises by o⁄ering a more favourable payment rate. For instance, the Government
may choose to prefer timber harvest and subsequent reforestation as land-use to cash funding on carbon
markets and ￿nance conservation on the remaining habitat.33 In this case, our model allows framing of
32Note that this scenario does not exclude to push toward a form of development which is perceived as environmental-friendly.
33Under the CDM (Clean Development Mechanism) of the Kyoto Protocol, forest conservation/avoided deforestation e⁄orts
were not considered in the ￿rst commitment period (2008-2012) (IPCC, 2007). On the contrary, through the CDM, investment
in tree planting projects has been undertaken (Santilli et al., 2005; van Vliet, 2003). In our model, this would imply an ￿1 lower
11the competition between these two "green" but mutually exclusive land destinations, i.e. secondary forests
vs. primary forests. Finally, the Government could simply consider it fair and/or politically expedient to
better reward conservation as soon as the restriction on development is binding and the real conservation
cost opportunity is implicitly revealed.
As in the previous section, the optimal conversion threshold, BC(A) = B￿￿(A), must be determined by
matching bene￿ts and costs from conversion. Unlike the previous case, when developing land in addition to
the pro￿t accruing from agriculture, (1￿￿)￿A
￿￿
r , the landholder can earn a higher payment for ES provision
since (￿￿2 ￿ ￿1) B
r￿￿ > 0. Hence, it makes sense to clear land as B increases. However, as above market
competition has a negative e⁄ect on the value from farming which, being entry-free, lies below (1￿￿)c. This
e⁄ect is accounted for the ￿rst term (Z1(A) ￿ 0 for A ￿ ￿ A) in (7) since as limB!0 V (A;B; ￿ A) = 0 then to
keep V (A;B; ￿ A) ￿nite we must set Z2 = 0. It follows that (7) reduces to:
V (A;B; ￿ A) = Z1(A)B￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
r




As in the previous case, we determine Z1(A) and B￿￿(A) by imposing the free entry condition and zero
marginal rents at B￿￿(A). That is,
Proposition 2 Provided that each agent rationally forecasts the future dynamics of the market for agricul-
tural goods for land to be converted the following condition must hold
V (A;B￿￿(A); ￿ A) = (1 ￿ ￿)c (12)
where the conversion rule is
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c; for A++ < A ￿ ￿ A; (c)
(13)
(ii) if ^ A > ￿ A then
B￿￿(A) = 0; for A0 < A ￿ ￿ A (13 bis)
where ￿ = 1￿￿
￿￿2￿￿1; ^ A = ( ￿







Proof. See appendix A.3.
Equation (12) de￿nes the dynamic zero pro￿t condition which must hold at B￿￿(A). Proposition 2
illustrates the conversion dynamic as B ￿ uctuates according to (2). Here, unlike the previous case, the
threshold B￿￿(A) is an increasing continuous function of A and the conversion region is above the barrier.
Development is worthwhile only if B crosses B￿￿(A) from below. In the conservation region the landholder
conserves as B is not high enough to trigger conversion and waits until the stochastic process B moves up
to B￿￿(A). At that point, a mass of landholders enters the market keeping pro￿ts low enough to push the
barrier upward.
than ￿2 in relative terms. Only recently, at the December 2009 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) meeting in Copenhagen this controversial issue discussed and ￿nally forest conservation should now be allowed to
qualify (Phelps et al., 2010). See also Fargione et al. (2008) on land clearing and biofuel carbon debt. On palm oil trees vs.
primary forests see Butler et al., (2009), Fitzherber et al., (2008) and Koh and Ghazoul (2008).
12Also in this case, depending on the value of ￿ A, two di⁄erent scenarios emerge (see ￿gure 4 and 5). That
is,
(1) if ^ A ￿ ￿ A then
￿ a surface equal to ^ A is converted independently from the value taken by B. In the interval A0 < A ￿ ^ A
landholders rush as agricultural pro￿ts are so high that there is no reason to wait. Moreover, they
know that no matter what value B takes, they are paid more for conserving less since ￿￿2 > ￿1;
￿ once the surface ^ A has been converted, landholders convert smoothly up to A++ according to (13b).
Note that over the interval ^ A < A ￿ A++, as land is converted, an increasing B is required to trigger
conversion. This is due to the fact that pro￿t from agriculture does not cover the cost of clearing and
settling land for cultivation. Hence, landholders convert only if the payment for conservation is high
enough to cover the gap.
￿ if B is high enough to support conversion up to A++ then a run is activated and the remaining land
is cleared up to the upper limit. This dynamic is due to the fact that an upper limit, ￿ A, has been
established for development. In fact, since for A > ￿ A the value attached to conversion vanishes, to
cash it each landholder must run to anticipate the others. However, as in the previous case, the run
dissipates the rent that the landholders earn by postponing conversion and collecting information on
market pro￿tability, i.e. at B￿￿(A++) = B￿￿( ￿ A), (1 ￿ ￿)￿
r ￿ A￿￿ + (￿￿2 ￿ ￿1)
B
￿￿( ￿ A)
r￿￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)c. Note
that also in this case the occurrence of a run is due to the external e⁄ect (VB( ￿ A;B; ￿ A) > 0) induced
by the presence of a ceiling on land development.
Figure 4: Optimal conversion threshold with ￿1 < ￿￿2 and ^ A ￿ ￿ A
13Figure 5: Optimal conversion threshold with ￿1 < ￿￿2 and ^ A > ￿ A
(2) If ^ A > ￿ A a surface equal to ￿ A is converted for any B. As above, in the interval A0 < A ￿ ￿ A,
landholders rush for two reasons, namely high agricultural pro￿ts and a more generous transfer to
compensate conservation. Also in this case the limit, ￿ A, restricts pro￿table land conversion over the
surface ^ A ￿ ￿ A > 0 where land would be converted for any B even without a conservation payment.
The analysis of the case where ^ A > ￿ A is obvious since B￿￿(A) = 0. Let￿ s then focus on the case ^ A ￿ ￿ A. In
(13) over the interval A0 < A ￿ ^ A, B￿￿(A) = 0 and then the only interesting comparative statics are those
concerning ^ A provided in table 1 and previously discussed. For ^ A < A ￿ ￿ A the discussion provided in section
3.1 applies as the two barriers B￿(A) and B￿￿(A) are symmetric and react to changes in the parameters
in the opposite way. However, this implies that the above considerations on the impact of a change in the
parameters are still valid.
￿ c r ￿
￿ 0 ￿ 0 ￿ 0 ￿ 0
￿ ￿2 ￿1 ￿2 ￿
￿ 0 ￿ 0 ￿ 0 ￿ 0 < 0
Table 3: Comparative statics on B￿￿(A)
An increase in ￿ has a monotonic downward shifting e⁄ect on the barrier.34 This makes sense since for any
level of B the payment rate on the additional marginal land unit to be set aside is higher if land is developed
(￿2 > ￿1). We complete the analysis of (13) by studying the barrier B￿￿(A) for A++ < A ￿ ￿ A. Since the
option value multiple,
￿1









￿ 0 for r ￿ ￿(
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￿ A)￿
< 0 for r < ￿(
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B￿￿(A) < 0 since for ￿2￿ > ￿1 is ￿2 > ￿1:
14Finally, also in this case, the policy parameters ￿1, ￿2 and ￿ are neutral in the de￿nition of A++ in (13 bis).
This threshold depends only on ^ A and the ceiling ￿ A. We ￿nd that @A
++
@ ￿ A > 0 and @A
++
@ ^ A > 0. If the limit ￿ A
is less strict, the landholders are less willing to dissipate information rents and participate in the run only
for high level of B. A lower ^ A implies a faster fall in the pro￿t from agriculture as A increases and then a
higher incentive for developing land as soon as B is high enough. Since this consideration is anticipated by
all landholders, the run starts at a lower A++.
4 Voluntary participation or contract enforceability?
Once the optimal conversion rules have been determined, we focus in this section on the issue of voluntary
participation which is a crucial aspect in a PES scheme (Wunder, 2005). In this section we present the con-
ditions under which the conservation contract is accepted on a voluntary basis. In this respect, two elements
must be considered. First, the dynamic of the whole conversion process involving all the landholders who
enrolled under the conservation program. Second, the restrictions on land development that the Government
may wish to impose in the form of takings on landholders not entering the conservation program.35
Focusing on the second element, the Government may ￿nd it desirable for the landholder to only partially
develop his plot, i.e. 0 < ￿ ￿ 1. Conversely, from (9) and (12) it emerges that the landholder may consider
it pro￿table to develop the entire plot, i.e. ￿ = 0. Therefore, the conservation contract may be accepted on a
voluntary basis only if each landholder is better-o⁄signing it than not. As can be easily seen, the acceptance
will depend on the expectation concerning the ability of the Government to impose a ￿ > 0. Let￿ s formalize
this consideration assuming that no compensation is paid if a taking occurs. Since by propositions 1 and 2









for C =￿;￿￿ (14)
where ￿ 2 [0;1] is the probability of regulation, i.e. the restriction ￿ holds also for landholders not signing
the contract. In (14) the LHS describes the position of a landholder within the program while on the RHS
we have the expected present value for a landholder not accepting the contract and developing land at time
t. Note that in the last case the conversion option is exercised as soon as the expected cost of conversion,
(1 ￿ ￿￿)c, equals the expected bene￿t from conversion. Rearranging (14) yields:
￿1
r ￿ ￿
BC(A) + (1 ￿ ￿)c ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)c (15)
which holds if
￿1BC(A) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(r ￿ ￿)c ￿ 0 for C =￿;￿￿
where (r ￿￿)c is the annualized conversion cost. Depending on the parameters this condition may not hold
for some A. Note in fact that since B￿(A) is a decreasing function of A, while B￿￿(A) is increasing, (15)
implies that:
Proposition 3 If ￿ 2 [0;1) then contract acceptance can be voluntary for some but not all the landholders
in the conservation program.
Proof. Straightforward from propositions 1 and 2.
Segerson and Miceli (1998) show that an agreement can always be signed on a voluntary basis if the
probability of future regulation is positive. By Proposition 3 we show that this result does not hold in our
frame. In fact, uncertainty about future regulation does not allow capturing of all the agents who can be
35Although most of the PES programs in developing countries were introduced as quid pro quo for legal restrictions on land
clearing, there are no speci￿c contract conditions preventing the landholder from clearing the area enrolled under the program
(Pagiola, 2008, p. 717). In principle, sanctions may apply. For instance, in the PSA (Pagos por Servicios Ambientales) program
in Costa Rica, payments received plus interest should be returned by the landholders exiting the scheme (FONAFIFO, 2007).
However, in a developing country context, economic and political costs may reduce the enforcement of such sanction.
15potentially regulated. A similar result is obtained by Langpap and Wu (2004) in a regulator-landowner two-
period model for conservation decisions under uncertainty and irreversibility. In their paper, since contract
pay-o⁄s are uncertain and signing is an irreversible decision, under certain conditions a landholder may not
accept it to stay ￿ exible. Unlike them, we show that under the same threat of regulation a contract can be
voluntarily signed by some landholders and not by others. Not surprisingly, imposing by contract constraints
on land development reduces ￿ exibility and discourages voluntary participation. Clearly, due to decreasing
pro￿t from agriculture, this holds for some landholders but not for all since entering the conservation program
becomes more attractive as land is progressively cleared.36
Summing up, we can conclude that voluntary participation crucially depends on the likelihood of takings
but also on the magnitude of the compensation payment which a court may impose. In fact, needless to
say, if takings can be compensated, then, by (14) and (15), the requirement for contract acceptance becomes
more stringent and it is more di¢ cult to sustain agreements on a voluntary basis.37
5 The long-run average rate of forest conversion
In line with Ferraro (2001, p. 997) we have shown that even if the ES provided by a targeted ecosystem (￿1 ￿
1) is not entirely compensated for, we may be able to induce landholders to conserve their plot. However,
we believe that this result only "statically" addresses the conservation/development dilemma. Hence, in this
section we aim to study the temporal implications of the optimal conversion policy, i.e. how long it takes to
clear the target surface ￿ A, and the impact of increasing uncertainty about future environmental bene￿ts, B,
and conversion cost, c, on conversion speed under the two policy scenarios characterized above. To do so,
we derive the long-run average growth rate of forest conversion through a robust linear approximation (see
Appendix A.4 and A.5).38
5.1 Case with ￿1 > ￿￿2
Let￿ s consider the case where b A ￿ ￿ A. This represents the more interesting case since the analysis below
remains valid also for the opposite case over the range A < A+. Note in fact that for A ￿ A+ the long-run
rate of reforestation must obviously tend to in￿nity due to the conversion run.











B for ￿ < ^ ￿ (16)
where ^ ￿=
￿2
￿2￿1 (1 ￿ ￿)c.
The ￿rst term on the RHS of (16) represents the expected discounted pro￿t from the cultivation of land
conditional on the number of farmers remaining constant. The multiple
￿2
￿2￿1 < 1 accounts for the presence
of uncertainty and irreversibility. The second term is the expected discounted ￿ ow of payments implicitly
given up by developing land net of the payments for conservation paid for setting aside ￿ as required by
the Government. Note that ￿ can be de￿ned as a regulated process in the sense of Harrison (1985, chp. 2)
with ^ ￿ as upper re￿ ecting barrier. This implies that when a reduction of B drives ￿ upward toward ^ ￿ some
landholders ￿nd it pro￿table to convert land. New entries in the market, however, determine a drop along
PA (A) which by balancing for the e⁄ect of B prevents ￿ from rising above ^ ￿. Since entry is instantaneous,
the rate of deforestation is in￿nite at ^ ￿.39 Conversely, if ￿ < ^ ￿ the level of B is high enough to support
conservation, no entries occur and consequently the deforestation rate is null. Hence, the re￿ ecting barrier
36Note that in this respect the scenario ￿1 < ￿￿2 is the most problematic since switching to competitive farming is so
advantageous for the ￿rst developers that they never accept the contract. This implies that (1) should be restated as L0 = A0
0+F
with A0
0 > A0 since by (15) only a lower number of landholders may enter the program on a voluntary basis.
37On compensation and land taking see Adler (2008).
38See Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp. 372-373), and Hartman and Hendrickson (2002) for a calculation of the long-run average
growth rate of investment.
39The fact that at ^ ￿ the rate of conversion is in￿nite follows from the non-di⁄erentiability of B and then of A with respect to
the time t (see Harrison, 1985; Dixit, 1993).
16^ ￿ does not generate a ￿nite rate of deforestation over time but long periods of inaction followed by short
periods of rapid bursts of land conversion.
In this section, our aim is to then ￿nd a steady-state (long-run) distribution for A from which we
can determine the average growth rate of forest conversion over a long period of time. Since A and B
enter additively on (16) some manipulation is required to apply the well-known properties of log-normal
distribution and show that ￿ is log-normally distributed.40 Denoting by 1
dtE(dlnA) the measure of the
average growth rate of forest conversion, in the appendix we prove that:

















and the average or expected long-run growth rate of deforestation can be approximated by:
1
dt











where A0 ￿ ~ A < ^ A and ^ A = ( ￿
rc)1=￿.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Thus, if ~ B is the current value of ES and, by (10), ~ A is the corresponding optimal surface of converted
land, the expression in (17b) is the best guess for the average rate at which the forested surface, ￿ A ￿ ~ A, is
cleared. Remember that if then ~ A > ^ A the deforestation rate is null since ￿
rA￿￿ < c for b A < A ￿ A.
Furthermore, it is straightforward to verify that the rate in (17b) is increasing in the volatility of future
payments. Although at a ￿rst glance this result may seem counterintuitive, it follows from the distribution
of the log-normal process ￿ with an upper re￿ ecting barrier at ^ ￿. A higher volatility has two distinct e⁄ects.
First, it pushes the barrier ^ ￿ downward; second, by increasing the positive skewness of the distribution of ￿,
it raises the probability of the barrier being reached.41 Both e⁄ects induce a higher rate of deforestation in
both the short-run and long-run.
We also note that a higher conversion cost c induces a lower long-run average rate of deforestation. Two
e⁄ects must be recognized. The ￿rst is immediate and driven by the higher c. The second is more subtle. A
higher c prevents from converting now for a certain B. Since conversion in the future will be triggered by a
decreasing B the landholder can bene￿t from an implicit advantage by paying a lower (￿1 ￿￿￿2)B which is
a conversion cost opportunity.
5.2 Case with ￿1 < ￿￿2










B for & < ^ & (18)
where ^ & =
￿1
￿1￿1 (1 ￿ ￿)c.
The ￿rst term on the RHS of (18) is the expected discounted pro￿t from the cultivation of land if any
further conversion occurs. The multiple
￿1
￿1￿1 > 1 accounts for uncertainty and irreversibility. Unlike (16),
since ￿1 < ￿￿2 the second term stands for the expected discounted ￿ ow of payments received when developing
￿; net of the payments implicitly given up. Again, & can be characterized as a regulated process having ^ & as
upper re￿ ecting barrier. Whenever an increase in B leads & upward toward ^ & new plots are cleared. This will
produce an increase in the supply of agricultural goods and consequently a drop along PA (A) preventing &
from passing ^ &. It follows that to keep the surface conserved unchanged, we must have & > ^ &.
40Technically, the log-normality is a property of the process for ￿ linearized around an initial point ( ~ B; ~ A). See Appendix A.5
for further details.
41We show in appendix A.6 that to a higher ￿ corresponds a higher probability of hitting ^ ￿ and thus a higher long run average
deforestation rate.
42The same discussion provided in the previous section applies for A ￿ A++.
17As shown in the appendix:































where ~ A > ^ A and ^ A = ( ￿
rc)1=￿.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
As above, (19b) is the best guess for the average rate at which the forest stock, ￿ A￿ ~ A, is exhausted over a
long-run horizon. Furthermore, the long-run average rate of deforestation (19b) is decreasing in the volatility
of future payments. Again, it should be remembered that & is a log-normal process with an upper re￿ ecting
barrier at ^ &. As volatility soars the barrier ^ & moves upward and positive skewness in the distribution of &
increases. Whilst the ￿rst has a reducing e⁄ect on the rate, the second raises the probability of hitting ^ & and
consequently the rate of deforestation.43 In addition, since the expected discounted pro￿t from competitive
farming decreases as land is converted, the former e⁄ect prevails in the long-run. Conversely, we ￿nd that
the rate is increasing in c. This may seem surprising at ￿rst sight. As a higher c prevents conversion we
would expect landholders to hold on the decision to develop, but postponing conversion is costly since the
per-period increase in payments (￿￿2 ￿ ￿1)B > 0 would have to be given up. Since the weight of expected
discounted higher payments accruing if conversion is anticipated prevails over the expected pay-o⁄ from
delay, the average rate of deforestation is increasing in c. More formally, a higher c, by inducing a shift
upward for the barrier, should de￿nitely decrease the probability of hitting it. However, as c increases, then
^ A decreases and so does A++. This means that a run will start at a lower surface A++ as soon as B￿￿( ￿ A)
has been reached. Since the run will exhaust the stock ￿ A and drastically lower the pro￿t from agriculture
then A++ ￿ ^ A landholders will prefer to anticipate the conversion. Note that since
@(A
++￿ ^ A)
@ ^ A > 0 , even for
a B < B￿￿( ￿ A), they will prefer to convert to trade-o⁄ the dramatic e⁄ect on the pro￿t due to the run with
a higher pro￿t from farming. This latter e⁄ect justi￿es a higher deforestation rate in the long-run.
6 The Costa Rica case study
In this section we provide a numerical example to illustrate our ￿ndings. We calibrate the model to ￿t the
characteristics of a humid Atlantic zone of Costa Rica.44 Parameters in our calculations take the following
values:
1. The total extent of originally forested area is ￿ A = 320000 hectares. On this extent, we consider a
converted portion equal to A0 = 25000 hectares.45 We draw demand for agricultural products as in
Bulte et al. (2002) by setting ￿ = $6990062 (in 1998 US$) and ￿ = 0:887.
2. The annual value of ES is equal to ~ B = $75=ha. This value accounts only for the forest production
function and does not include the regulatory function and existence values. As B is assumed to ￿ uctuate
according to (2) we investigate the impact of its drift, ￿, and volatility, ￿, on the optimal forest stock.
To do this, in our analysis ￿ takes values 0, 0:025, and 0:05 while ￿ varies within the interval [0;0:325].
3. A 7% risk free interest rate is assumed (r = 0:07). Finally, unlike Bulte et al. (2002) where c = 0 we
also consider di⁄erent levels of costly deforestation.
43See appendix A.6 for the intuition behind this result.
44Detailed data are provided by Bulte et al. (2002, pp. 154-155). See also Conrad (1997).
45Note that later we will set ~ A = A0 = 25000.
186.1 Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation under dif-
ferent payment schemes
6.1.1 Case with ￿1 > ￿￿2
For the case ￿1 > ￿￿2 we study the following ￿ve di⁄erent policy scenarios:
￿1 ￿2 ￿ ￿
Scenario 1 1 0 0 1
Scenario 2 0:7 0 0 1:4286
Scenario 3 1 0 0:3 0:7
Scenario 4 0:7 0:5 0:3 1:2727
Scenario 5 0:7 1 0:3 1:75
Table 4: policy scenarios
and compare them for two di⁄erent levels of costly deforestation, c = 0 and c = 500, respectively.46 In
particular, by these comparisons, our aim is
- 1 vs. 2: to highlight the impact of a reduction in the compensation for ES provision on the landholders￿
decision to conserve. Note that scenario 1 resembles the case of a centralized economy in Bulte et
al. (2002) where the planner optimally allocates land by comparing expected marginal bene￿t from
conservation and its expected marginal cost opportunity.
- 1 vs. 3: to study the e⁄ect of restricted land development on the optimal forest stock and on the long-run
average rate of deforestation.
- 4 vs. 5: to verify the e⁄ect of a more favourable conservation payment rate when the restriction on land
development is binding (i.e. land development is privately optimal).
In the tables below we provide the optimal forest stock which should be held, ￿ A ￿ ~ A,47 and the average
deforestation rate (Def rate) at which such stock should be optimally exhausted in the long-run.48 Note
that in our calculations the deforestation rate may be null in two cases. First, when the optimal forest
stock, ￿ A ￿ ~ A is completely exhausted and second, when conditions in (17b) or (19b) do not hold. We will
distinguish between them using 0 for the former and a dash for the latter.
Scenarios 1 and 2 By Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8 we show that:
i) the optimal forest stock increases as ￿ soars. With higher uncertainty, conversion is triggered at a lower
level for B. This implies that for any given value of ~ B the corresponding optimal converted surface
must be lower. Note that as anticipated by (17) the long-run rate of deforestation is increasing in ￿;
ii) the optimal forest stock increases in ￿. This makes sense as long as a higher expected growth rate on the
level of PES induces conversion postponement. The long-run average rate of deforestation decreases
in the drift. This is not a surprising result since an increase in ￿, by leading ￿ downward and far from
^ ￿, must reduce the average rate;
iii) for c = 0 Government policies have no e⁄ect on the long-run deforestation rate. On the contrary, we
observe a reducing e⁄ect when c = 500. However, note that if conversion is costly (c > 0) and ￿ A < ^ A,
the reduction in the long-run deforestation rate is also due to the presence of a threshold A+ where
the deforestation rate is in￿nite.49 Note also that as may be expected, a higher land stock is conserved
with costly conversion. Finally, we observe that a reduction in ￿1 has a strong e⁄ect on the optimal
forest stock but only a marginal e⁄ect on the deforestation rate.
46Numerical results under other scenarios are available upon request.
47By substituting ~ B = $75=ha in equation (10) we get the optimal converted land ~ A = A( ~ B), then subtracting ~ A from ￿ A we
obtain the optimal forest stock.
48Note that variations in the long-run deforestation rate under di⁄erent policy scenarios are only due to a di⁄erent initial
converted land stock ~ A:




0:887 = 9:455￿105 > 320000 = ￿ A.
19σ Ā- Ã Def rate Ā- Ã Def rate Ā- Ã Def rate
0 0 0 76684 - 222474 -
0,025 0 0 79996 - 223155 -
0,05 0 0 88790 - 225127 -
0,075 461 0,0032 100809 - 228196 -
0,1 23495 0,0056 114211 - 232103 -
0,125 44778 0,0088 127886 - 236574 -
0,15 64431 0,0127 141240 - 241361 -
0,175 82567 0,0173 153977 - 246265 -
0,2 99297 0,0225 165955 - 251135 -
0,225 114723 0,0285 177125 0,0004 255866 -
0,25 128945 0,0352 187484 0,0070 260389 -
0,275 142053 0,0426 197056 0,0144 264662 -
0,3 154136 0,0507 205879 0,0225 268664 -
0,325 165273 0,0595 213998 0,0314 272388 0,0032
α=0.05 α=0.025 α=0.00
Table 5: Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation in scenario 1 with c = 0
σ Ā- Ã Def rate Ā- Ã Def rate Ā- Ã Def rate
0 0 0 0 0 174200 -
0,025 0 0 0 0 175218 -
0,05 0 0 0 0 178165 -
0,075 0 0 0 0 182755 -
0,1 0 0 12349 - 188596 -
0,125 0 0 32793 - 195279 -
0,15 0 0 52758 - 202436 -
0,175 0 0 71798 - 209767 -
0,2 0 0 89706 - 217048 -
0,225 13115 0,0285 106405 0,0004 224121 -
0,25 34376 0,0352 121892 0,0070 230883 -
0,275 53973 0,0426 136201 0,0144 237270 -
0,3 72036 0,0507 149391 0,0225 243253 -
0,325 88687 0,0595 161529 0,0314 248821 0,0032
α=0.00 α=0.025 α=0.05
Table 6: Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation in scenario 2 with c = 0
For instance, consider the case where ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 0:225. Under scenario 1, the optimal forest stocks held
are respectively 114723ha with c = 0 and 215077ha with c = 500 while the deforestation rates are 2:85% and
2:45% respectively. Under scenario 2 with a 30% lower conservation payment rate, the forest stock increases
from 13115ha with c = 0 to 173266ha with c = 500. The rate is unchanged with c = 0 while it reduces
to 2:31% for c = 500. From tables 5 and 7 we note that a slightly higher expected payment growth rate,
￿ = 0:025, induces an increase in the forested land stock from 177125ha to 202243ha while the deforestation
rate becomes practically null (from 0:04% to 0:03%). In this case by reducing ￿1 to 0:7, the forest stock is
20106405ha with c = 0 and 156461ha with c = 500. Conversely, there is no e⁄ect on the deforestation rate
since we have respectively 0:04% and 0:03%.
Comparing results for ￿ = 0:05 in all the tables, the long-run average rate of deforestation is practically
null. In particular, comparing table 6 and 7 we note that, even if at the cost of some hectares of forest,
a second-best policy establishing a reduced payment, ￿1 = 0:7, guarantees the same results in terms of
deforestation rates and a forest stock however higher than the one currently available in the Atlantic region.50
σ Ā- Ã Def rate Ā- Ã Def rate Ā- Ã Def rate
0 138990 - 138986 - 138986 -
0,025 149250 0,0003 140887 - 139960 -
0,05 159060 0,0011 145990 - 142796 -
0,075 168411 0,0025 153098 - 147262 -
0,1 177304 0,0046 161212 - 153037 -
0,125 185739 0,0072 169705 - 159775 -
0,15 193725 0,0106 178218 - 167148 -
0,175 201268 0,0145 186547 - 174877 -
0,2 208381 0,0192 194577 - 182737 -
0,225 215077 0,0245 202243 0,0003 190556 -
0,25 221371 0,0305 209514 0,0060 198207 -
0,275 227278 0,0372 216376 0,0124 205601 -
0,3 232816 0,0446 222827 0,0196 212678 -
0,325 238004 0,0527 228876 0,0274 219400 0,0027
α=0.05 α=0.025 α=0.00
Table 7: Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation in scenario 1 with c = 500
σ Ā- Ã Def rate Ā- Ã Def rate Ā- Ã Def rate
0 76689 - 76683 - 76683 -
0,025 89299 0,0003 79011 - 77875 -
0,05 101473 0,0010 85279 - 81352 -
0,075 113184 0,0023 94061 - 86846 -
0,1 124419 0,0042 104158 - 93986 -
0,125 135168 0,0067 114813 - 102364 -
0,15 145427 0,0098 125580 - 111595 -
0,175 155193 0,0136 136202 - 121343 -
0,2 164471 0,0180 146526 - 131332 -
0,225 173267 0,0231 156461 0,0003 141346 -
0,25 181589 0,0288 165955 0,0056 151222 -
0,275 189452 0,0353 174980 0,0117 160837 -
0,3 196867 0,0424 183524 0,0185 170108 -
0,325 203852 0,0503 191587 0,0260 178978 0,0026
α=0.00 α=0.025 α=0.05
Table 8: Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation in scenario 2 with c = 500
Scenarios 1 and 3 Let￿ s focus on the role of restrictions on land development by comparing scenario 1
(tables 5, 7) and 3 (tables 9, 10) where respectively no set-aside (￿ = 0) and 30% (￿ = 0:3) set-aside require-
ments are established by the conservation contract signed by the landholder. Note that such requirement is
not compensated (￿2 = 0) and thus it is similar to a taking. In this case, however, unlike a taking which is
generally imposed by law, the requirement is accepted on a voluntary basis by signing the initial conservation
50Bulte et al., (2002) report a forest stock of about 80:000 ￿ 100:000ha.
21contract.
σ Ā- Ã Def rate Ā- Ã Def rate Ā- Ã Def rate
0 52246 - 157244 - 254765 -
0,025 71596 0,0004 159460 - 255220 -
0,05 89598 0,0014 165343 - 256539 -
0,075 106259 0,0032 173382 - 258592 -
0,1 121666 0,0056 182347 - 261206 -
0,125 135903 0,0088 191494 - 264196 -
0,15 149049 0,0127 200427 - 267398 -
0,175 161180 0,0173 208946 - 270679 -
0,2 172371 0,0225 216959 - 273936 -
0,225 182690 0,0285 224431 0,0004 277101 -
0,25 192202 0,0352 231360 0,0070 280126 -
0,275 200971 0,0426 237763 0,0144 282984 -
0,3 209053 0,0507 243664 0,0225 285661 -
0,325 216503 0,0595 249095 0,0314 288152 0,0032
α=0.00 α=0.025 α=0.05
Table 9: Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation in scenario 3 with c = 0
σ Ā- Ã Def rate Ā- Ã Def rate Ā- Ã Def rate
0 188722 - 188718 - 188718 -
0,025 196684 0,0003 190199 - 189477 -
0,05 204239 0,0012 194161 - 191683 -
0,075 211386 0,0027 199655 - 195146 -
0,1 218135 0,0049 205888 - 199608 -
0,125 224493 0,0077 212371 - 204787 -
0,15 230473 0,0111 218826 - 210423 -
0,175 236088 0,0152 225100 - 216297 -
0,2 241352 0,0201 231109 - 222235 -
0,225 246279 0,0256 236811 0,0003 228105 -
0,25 250886 0,0318 242187 0,0063 233814 -
0,275 255190 0,0387 247232 0,0130 239298 -
0,3 259206 0,0463 251950 0,0204 244516 -
0,325 262951 0,0546 256351 0,0285 249446 0,0029
α=0.00 α=0.025 α=0.05
Table 10: Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation in scenario 3 with c = 500
The e⁄ect of the restriction is quite evident. In fact, by reducing the pro￿t from agriculture it implicitly
induces forest conservation. However, for the case discussed in the previous section (￿ = 0, ￿ = 0:225) the
introduction of such constraint has no signi￿cant e⁄ect on the forest stock and on the rate of deforestation.
With c = 0, the forest stock increases from 114723ha to 182690ha while the deforestation rate remains the
same (2:85%). For c = 500, the forested surface increases from 215077ha to 246279ha with a limited change
in the deforestation rate (from 2:45% to 2:56%). For the same level of volatility, as expected, a higher
payment growth rate (￿ = 0:025) induces landholders to hold on conservation since the cost opportunity of
conversion is higher.
22Scenarios 4 and 5 We elicit the e⁄ect of a payment for conserved land (￿2) when conversion is optimal
by comparing scenario 4 (tables 11 and 13) and scenario 5 (tables 12 and 14).
σ Ā- Ã Def rate Ā- Ã Def rate Ā- Ã Def rate
0 0 0 663 - 192003 -
0,025 0 0 5010 - 192896 -
0,05 0 0 16552 - 195484 -
0,075 0 0 32326 - 199513 -
0,1 0 0 49915 - 204641 -
0,125 0 0 67862 - 210508 -
0,15 0 0 85390 - 216791 -
0,175 8385 0,0173 102105 - 223227 -
0,2 30341 0,0225 117826 - 229619 -
0,225 50588 0,0285 132486 0,0004 235829 -
0,25 69252 0,0352 146082 0,0070 241764 -
0,275 86457 0,0426 158644 0,0144 247372 -
0,3 102314 0,0507 170223 0,0225 252625 -
0,325 116931 0,0595 180879 0,0314 257512 0,0032
α=0.00 α=0.025 α=0.05
Table 11: Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation in scenario 4 with c = 0
σ Ā- Ã Def rate Ā- Ã Def rate Ā- Ã Def rate
0 76685 - 94892 0,0027 110689 0,0026
0,025 80181 - 95259 0,0027 110762 0,0025
0,05 83364 - 96232 0,0025 110974 0,0024
0,075 86264 - 97556 0,0022 111304 0,0023
0,1 88908 - 99024 0,0019 111724 0,0021
0,125 91322 - 100514 0,0015 112205 0,0019
0,15 93528 - 101963 0,0012 112721 0,0017
0,175 95544 - 103339 0,0008 113251 0,0014
0,2 97390 - 104629 0,0004 113779 0,0011
0,225 99080 - 105829 - 114293 0,0009
0,25 100629 - 106940 - 114786 0,0006
0,275 102051 - 107965 - 115254 0,0004
0,3 103356 - 108910 - 115695 0,0001
0,325 104555 - 109780 - 116106 -
α=0.00 α=0.025 α=0.05
Table 12: Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation in scenario 5 with c = 0
In both scenarios when the entire plot is conserved the payment, ￿1, is equal to 0:7. By contract, as soon as
the trigger for land conversion is met, a 30% restriction on land development (￿ = 0:3) must be respected
in exchange for a payment rate ￿2 = 0:5 in scenario 4 and ￿2 = 1 in scenario 5. We observe that an increase
in the compensation for the restriction implies, ceteris paribus, a reduction in forest stock. For ￿ = 0,
￿ = 0:225 and c = 0, 50588ha of forest are conserved under scenario 4 while no conservation is undertaken
under scenario 5. If conversion is costly (c = 500), the forested surface is equal to 188080ha under scenario
234 and reduces to 144113ha under scenario 5. The reduction in the deforestation rate is minimal (from 2:36%
to 2:21%). The analysis above similarly applies when ￿ = 0:025.
σ Ā- Ã Def rate Ā- Ã Def rate Ā- Ã Def rate
0 98233 - 98228 - 98228 -
0,025 110097 0,0003 100421 - 99351 -
0,05 121511 0,0011 106319 - 102625 -
0,075 132458 0,0024 114566 - 107792 -
0,1 142927 0,0044 124024 - 114495 -
0,125 152914 0,0069 133977 - 122345 -
0,15 162419 0,0101 144007 - 130974 -
0,175 171443 0,0139 153874 - 140064 -
0,2 179994 0,0184 163436 - 149353 -
0,225 188080 0,0236 172613 0,0003 158642 -
0,25 195713 0,0294 181359 0,0058 167776 -
0,275 202908 0,0359 189653 0,0120 176647 -
0,3 209680 0,0432 197485 0,0189 185178 -
0,325 216046 0,0511 204860 0,0265 193320 0,0026
α=0.00 α=0.025 α=0.05
Table 13: Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation in scenario 4 with c = 500
σ Ā- Ã Def rate Ā- Ã Def rate Ā- Ã Def rate
0 35851 - 35846 - 35846 -
0,025 49690,57 0,0002 38394 - 37150 -
0,05 63131,56 0,0010 45270 - 40959 -
0,075 76139,87 0,0022 54938 - 46992 -
0,1 88691,55 0,0040 66108 - 54855 -
0,125 100767,8 0,0064 77955 - 64119 -
0,15 112354,7 0,0094 89993 - 74370 -
0,175 123443,5 0,0130 101933 - 85248 -
0,2 134029,8 0,0172 113600 - 96450 -
0,225 144113,7 0,0221 124887 0,0003 107739 -
0,25 153699 0,0277 135728 0,0054 118927 -
0,275 162793,1 0,0339 146083 0,0112 129877 -
0,3 171406,3 0,0409 155933 0,0178 140487 -
0,325 179551,5 0,0486 165270 0,0251 150687 0,0025
α=0.00 α=0.025 α=0.05
Table 14: Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation in scenario 5 with c = 500
6.1.2 Case with ￿1 < ￿￿2
In this section, the analysis is undertaken by ￿xing ￿1 = 0:4, ￿2 = 1,￿ = 0:5 (￿ = 5) and letting ￿ and
￿ vary as above. Di⁄erently, we suppose that conversion is costly and assume c = 1400 in table 15 and
c = 2000 in table 16.51 These conversion costs correspond to 11% and 16% respectively of the revenue from
51This is necessary to avoid degenerate scenarios. Note, for instance, that by (13) if c = 0 then B￿￿(A) = 0 for A0 < A ￿ 1.
24agriculture for e A = 25000 and to 58% and 83% for e A = 160000. Other parameters keep the same values
as those used in the previous section. In this case, as discussed in section 3.2, the policy introduced by the
Government is biased towards conversion. Note in fact that if the payment rate, ￿2, is null, then conversion
would stop at b A which, with the parameters used in this section, is always lower than A. It follows that the
additional deforestation, A ￿ b A, is due to the structure of incentives designed by the Government which by
paying ￿￿2 > ￿1 is implicitly making attractive an otherwise unpro￿table land conversion (￿
rA￿￿ < c for
b A < A ￿ A). In table 15, we observe that landholders generally prefer land conversion to conservation. Only
a limited surface may be conserved if ￿ = 0:05. This is mainly due, at least initially (up to b A), to positive
pro￿t from agriculture over the portion 1 ￿ ￿ coupled with a more favourable payment rate (￿2 > ￿1) on
the portion ￿ under conservation. In this interval, deforestation occurs at an in￿nite rate. Conversely, as c
increases since the speed of deforestation must slow down, we can obtain ￿nite deforestation rates. Studying
the impact of conversion costs we note, by comparing tables 15 and 16, that even if the policy is biased toward
conversion, the payment ￿￿2 > ￿1 may not be high enough to cover the gap between agricultural pro￿t and
conversion costs. This in turn results in very low or null rate of deforestation. Finally, an additional e⁄ect
is driven by the volatility of payments ￿. Not surprisingly, as uncertainty soars we ￿nd higher forest stocks
and lower rates of deforestation.
σ Ā- Ã Def rate Ā- Ã Def rate Ā- Ã Def rate
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0,025 0 0 0 0 0 0
0,05 0 0 0 0 0 0
0,075 0 0 0 0 721 0,0032
0,1 0 0 0 0 1657 0,0030
0,125 0 0 0 0 2727 0,0027
0,15 0 0 0 0 3874 0,0023
0,175 0 0 0 0 5048 0,0020
0,2 0 0 0 0 6214 0,0016
0,225 0 0 0 0 7348 0,0012
0,25 0 0 0 0 8434 0,0009
0,275 0 0 0 0 9462 0,0005
0,3 0 0 0 0 10427 0,0002
0,325 0 0 0 0 11328 -
α=0.00 α=0.025 α=0.05
Table 15: Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation with c = 1400
25σ Ā- Ã Def rate Ā- Ã Def rate Ā- Ã Def rate
0 76685 - 94892 0,0027 110689 0,0026
0,025 80181 - 95259 0,0027 110762 0,0025
0,05 83364 - 96232 0,0025 110974 0,0024
0,075 86264 - 97556 0,0022 111304 0,0023
0,1 88908 - 99024 0,0019 111724 0,0021
0,125 91322 - 100514 0,0015 112205 0,0019
0,15 93528 - 101963 0,0012 112721 0,0017
0,175 95544 - 103339 0,0008 113251 0,0014
0,2 97390 - 104629 0,0004 113779 0,0011
0,225 99080 - 105829 - 114293 0,0009
0,25 100629 - 106940 - 114786 0,0006
0,275 102051 - 107965 - 115254 0,0004
0,3 103356 - 108910 - 115695 0,0001
0,325 104555 - 109780 - 116106 -
α=0.00 α=0.025 α=0.05
Table 16: Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation with c = 2000
266.2 Long-run average rate of deforestation for a given forest stock
In this section we propose a di⁄erent exercise. In the previous section given a certain ~ B we computed
the optimal forest stock and the associated deforestation rate. However, by doing so, we did not address
the dynamic long-run e⁄ect of the di⁄erent conservation policies. In fact, since a history of the previous
deforestation dynamic is not available, a comparison between the di⁄erent rates of deforestation makes no
sense. Here, since we aim to illustrate the temporal implications of a conversion path, i.e. how long it takes
to clear the targeted surface ￿ A, we establish a common initial converted land surface, ~ A = 25000, and let
￿ and ￿ vary for di⁄erent levels of conversion cost, c. Then, by providing the long-run average deforestation
rate (Def rate) and the associated expected time for total conversion (Timing), we illustrate the impact of
increasing growth and volatility of future payments and conversion cost on conversion speed.
α
σ Def rate Timing Def rate Timing Def rate Timing
0 - ¥ - ¥ - ¥
0,025 0,0004 35775 - ¥ - ¥
0,05 0,0014 8944 - ¥ - ¥
0,075 0,0032 3978 - ¥ - ¥
0,1 0,0056 2241 - ¥ - ¥
0,125 0,0088 1436 - ¥ - ¥
0,15 0,0127 999 - ¥ - ¥
0,175 0,0173 736 - ¥ - ¥
0,2 0,0226 565 - ¥ - ¥
0,225 0,0285 448 0,0004 35755 - ¥
0,25 0,0352 364 0,0071 1794 - ¥
0,275 0,0426 302 0,0144 878 - ¥
0,3 0,0507 255 0,0226 565 - ¥
0,325 0,0595 218 0,0314 408 0,0032 3978
0 0,025 0,05
Table 17: Long-run deforestation rates and timing with c = 0
α
σ Def rate Timing Def rate Timing Def rate Timing
0 - ¥ - ¥ - ¥
0,025 0,0004 36334 - ¥ - ¥
0,05 0,0014 9089 - ¥ - ¥
0,075 0,0031 4043 - ¥ - ¥
0,1 0,0056 2277 - ¥ - ¥
0,125 0,0087 1459 - ¥ - ¥
0,15 0,0125 1015 - ¥ - ¥
0,175 0,0170 748 - ¥ - ¥
0,2 0,0222 574 - ¥ - ¥
0,225 0,0281 455 0,0004 36334 - ¥
0,25 0,0347 370 0,0069 1823 - ¥
0,275 0,0420 306 0,0142 892 - ¥
0,3 0,0499 259 0,0222 574 - ¥
0,325 0,0586 221 0,0309 414 0,0031 4043
0,05 0 0,025
Table 18: Long-run deforestation rates and timing with c = 200
27α
σ Def rate Timing Def rate Timing Def rate Timing
0 - ¥ - ¥ - ¥
0,025 0,0003 37239 - ¥ - ¥
0,05 0,0014 9315 - ¥ - ¥
0,075 0,0030 4143 - ¥ - ¥
0,1 0,0054 2333 - ¥ - ¥
0,125 0,0085 1496 - ¥ - ¥
0,15 0,0122 1041 - ¥ - ¥
0,175 0,0166 766 - ¥ - ¥
0,2 0,0216 588 - ¥ - ¥
0,225 0,0274 466 0,0003 37239 - ¥
0,25 0,0338 379 0,0068 1868 - ¥
0,275 0,0409 314 0,0139 914 - ¥
0,3 0,0487 265 0,0216 588 - ¥
0,325 0,0572 227 0,0301 425 0,0030 4143
0 0,025 0,05
Table 19: Long-run deforestation rates and timing with c = 500
By comparing table 17, 18 and 19 we observe that when uncertainty increases, higher conversion cost, c, has
a negligible e⁄ect in terms of delayed conversion. Conversely, with low uncertainty (￿ 2 [0;0:125]) and no
expected growth in the payments (￿ = 0), the di⁄erence in expected total conversion time between the cases
c = 500 and c = 0 is substantial (see ￿gure 6). However, note that this e⁄ect vanishes as ￿ rises to 2:5%.
This means that with low uncertainty it is possible to deter conversion even if costless (c = 0) by simply
guaranteeing an expected growth in the payments. This is consistent with the general stronger impact that
a higher ￿ has in terms of delayed conversion when compared to the e⁄ect due to increasing uncertainty.52
Figure 6: Di⁄erence in expected time for total conversion between c = 500 and c = 0
with ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 0:025.
52Our ￿ndings seem in contrast with the calibration used in Leroux et al. (2009) where the authors assume a deforestation
rate equal to 2.5 with ￿ = 0:05 and ￿ = 0:1. In fact, we show that for those values the deforestation rate should be null. A
2.5% deforestation rate would be justi￿ed only for lower ￿ and higher ￿:
287 Conclusions
In this paper we contribute to the vast literature on optimal land allocation under uncertainty and irreversible
habitat conversion. We extend previous work in three respects. First, departing from the standard central
planner perspective we investigate the role that competing farming may have on conversion dynamics. Pro￿ts
from conversion decreasing in the number of developers may discourage conversion in particular if society
is willing to reward habitat conservation as land use. Second, in this decentralized framework, we look at
the conservation e⁄ort that Government land policy, through a combination of voluntary and command
approaches, may stimulate.
In this regard, an interesting result is represented by the considerable amount of conservation that the
Government can induce by partially compensating agents for the ES provided.
In addition, we show that the existence of a ceiling for the stock of developable land may produce perverse
e⁄ects on conversion dynamics by activating a run which instantaneously exhausts the stock. Third, we
believe that time matters when dynamic land allocation is analysed. Hence, we suggest the use of the
optimal long-run average expected rate of conversion to assess the temporal performance of conservation
policy and we show its utility by running several numerical simulations based on realistic policy scenarios.
29A Appendix
A.1 Equilibrium under ￿1 > ￿￿2
The value function of a farmer is given by:
V (A;B; ￿ A) = Z2(A)B￿2 +
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
r




Since each agent rationally forecasts the future dynamics of the market for agricultural goods at B￿(A)





A￿￿ + (￿￿2 ￿ ￿1)
B￿(A)
r ￿ ￿
= (1 ￿ ￿)c (A.1.2)
In addition, the following conditions must hold (see e.g. proposition 1 in Bartolini (1993) and Grenadier
(2002, p. 699)):
VA(A;B￿(A); ￿ A) = Z0





@V (A;B￿(A); ￿ A)
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Finally, considering the limit on conversion, ￿ A; imposed by the Government it follows that:
Z2( ￿ A) = 0 (A.1.5)
Condition (A.1.4) illustrates two scenarios. In the ￿rst one, each landholder exercises the option to convert
at the level of B￿(A) where the value, V (A;B￿(A); ￿ A) is tangent to the conversion cost, (1 ￿ ￿)c.53 That




r￿￿ = 0. It is easy to verify that, as conjectured, Z2(A) < 0.
In the case V (A,B￿(A); ￿ A) is smooth at the conversion threshold and B￿(A) is a continuous function of




dA = 0. This implies that the landholder may bene￿t from marginally anticipating or delaying the
conversion decision. In particular, if VB(A,B￿(A); ￿ A) < 0 then the value of conversion is expected to increase
as B drops. Conversely, if VB(A,B￿(A); ￿ A) > 0 then losses must be expected as B drops. However, in both

















r￿￿ < 0, then (A.1.6) cannot hold at A = ￿ A. Therefore, (A.1.7) must hold at
A = ￿ A and by (A.1.2) it follows that:







c for A+ ￿ A ￿ ￿ A (A.1.8)
where ^ A = ( ￿
rc)1=￿ represents the last parcel conversion which makes economic sense. In fact, note that since
(￿￿2 ￿ ￿1) B
r￿￿ < 0 then ￿
rA￿￿ ￿ c for A ￿ ^ A.
53This condition holds at any re￿ecting barrier without any optimization being involved (Dixit, 1993).
30Now let￿ s de￿ne A+ as the largest A ￿ ￿ A that satis￿es (A.1.6). This implies that for all the landholders
in the range A+ ￿ A ￿ ￿ A, we have
dB
￿(A)
dA = 0 and conversion takes place at B￿( ￿ A). Over the range A < A+











c for A < A+ (A.1.9)

























The conversion policy is summarized by (A.1.8) and (A.1.9). The conversion policy should be smooth until
the surface A+ < ￿ A has been converted. At A+ landholders rush and a run takes place to convert the residual
land before the limit imposed by the Government is met. By (A.1.9), B￿(A) is decreasing with respect to A.
This makes sense since further land conversion reduces the pro￿t from agriculture and a landholder would
convert land only if she/he expects a future reduction in B.











)￿ ￿ 1 (A.1.10 bis)
Studying (A.1.10 bis) we can state that since
￿2
￿2￿1 > 0:
- if ^ A ￿ ￿ A then it must be ￿ A ￿ A+. This implies that there is no run taking place. Land will be converted
smoothly according to (A.1.8) up to ^ A since ￿
rA￿￿ ￿ c for A ￿ ^ A;
- if ^ A > ￿ A then it must be A+ < ￿ A. In this case, land is converted smoothly up to A+ where landholders
start a run to convert land up to ￿ A.
A.2 Value of the option to convert
In this appendix we show that, by competition, the value of the opportunity to develop the plot by the single
farmer is null at the conversion threshold. The value of the option to convert, F(A,B; ￿ A), is the solution of
the following di⁄erential equation (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, ch. 8):
1
2
￿2B2FBB(A;B; ￿ A) + ￿BFB(A;B; ￿ A) ￿ rF(A;B; ￿ A) = 0 for B > BC(A) (A.2.1)
where BC(A) is the optimal threshold for conversion. Note that this is an ordinary di⁄erential equation, the
general solution of which can be written as:
F(A;B; ￿ A) = C1(A)B￿1 + C2(A)B￿2 (A.2.2)
where 1 < ￿1 < r=￿, ￿2 < 0 are the positive and the negative root of the characteristic equation ￿(￿) =
1
2￿2￿(￿ ￿ 1) + ￿￿ ￿ r = 0, and C1, C2 are two constants to be determined.
Suppose for instance that ￿1 > ￿￿2.54 This implies that as B increases, the value of the option to
convert should vanish as (limB!1 F(A;B; ￿ A) = 0) then we set C1 = 0. Now, let￿ s determine the optimal
54It is easy to show that the results in this section would hold also for the case ￿1 < ￿2￿:
31conversion threshold B and the constant C1(A). We attach to the di⁄erential equation above the following
value matching and the smooth pasting conditions:
F(A;BC(A); ￿ A) = V (A;BC(A); ￿ A) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)c (A.2.3)






￿ (1 ￿ ￿)c
FB(A;BC(A); ￿ A) = VB(A;BC(A); ￿ A) (A.2.4)























Rearranging (A.2.4) and substituting we have:








(BC(A)1￿￿2 ￿ B￿(A)1￿￿2) = 0
As expected the value of the option to convert is null at BC(A) = B￿(A).
A.3 Equilibrium under ￿1 < ￿￿2
The value function of a farmer is given by:
V (A;B; ￿ A) = Z1(A)B￿1 +
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
r









A￿￿ + (￿￿2 ￿ ￿1)
B￿￿(A)
r ￿ ￿






@V (A;B￿￿(A); ￿ A)
@A













In addition, since land can be converted only up to ￿ A then it follows that:
Z1( ￿ A) = 0 (A.3.5)
Condition (A.3.4) illustrates two scenarios. In the ￿rst one, each landholder exercises the option to convert
at the level of B￿￿(A) where the value, V (A;B￿￿(A); ￿ A) is tangent to the conversion cost, (1 ￿ ￿)c. That is,




r￿￿ = 0. Since
￿￿2￿￿1
r￿￿ > 0 it can be can easily veri￿ed that,
as conjectured, Z1(A) < 0. In the case V (A;B￿￿(A); ￿ A) is smooth at the conversion threshold and B￿￿(A)
is a continuous function of A. In the second scenario, the optimal threshold B￿￿(A) does not change with
32A, i.e. VB(A;B￿￿(A); ￿ A) 6= 0 and
dB
￿￿(A)
dA = 0. As discussed in section A.1, this implies that at the margin
the landholder may bene￿t from anticipating or delaying the conversion decision.














r￿￿ > 0, then (A.3.6) cannot hold at A = ￿ A. Therefore, (A.3.7) must hold
at A = ￿ A. From (A.3.2) it follows that:







c for A++ < A ￿ ￿ A (A.3.8)
We now de￿ne A++ as the largest A ￿ ￿ A for which (A.3.6) holds. This means that for all the landholders
in the range A++ ￿ A ￿ ￿ A, we must have
dB
￿￿(A)
dA = 0 and conversion occurs at B￿￿( ￿ A). Over the range











c for A0 < A ￿ A++ (A.3.9)
However, note that B￿￿(A) < 0 for A < ^ A. Since by (2) B cannot be negative then it must be:
B￿￿(A) =
(
0; for A0 < A ￿ ^ A
￿1






c; for ^ A < A ￿ A++ (A.3.9 bis)

































As in section (A.1), two di⁄erent scenarios may arise. In fact, studying (A.3.10 bis) we observe that since
￿1
￿1￿1 > 0:
- if ^ A ￿ ￿ A then it must be ^ A ￿ A++ ￿ ￿ A. Land will be converted according to (A.3.9 bis) up to A++. At
A++ landholders will rush to convert land up to the limit, ￿ A, established by the Government (A.3.8);
- if ^ A > ￿ A then it must be ^ A > A++ > ￿ A. This implies that the conversion process follows (A.3.9 bis) and
land is instantaneously developed up to ￿ A.
A.4 Long-run distributions
Let h be a linear Brownian motion with parameters ￿ and ￿ that evolves according to dh = ￿dt + ￿dw.
Following Harrison (1985, pp. 90-91; see also Dixit 1993, pp. 58-68) the long-run density function for h
33￿ uctuating between a lower re￿ ecting barrier, a 2 (￿1;1), and an upper re￿ ecting barrier, b 2 (￿1;1),















￿2 a ￿ 6= 0
1
b￿a ￿ = 0:
(A.4.1)







￿2 (b￿h) ￿ > 0
0 ￿ ￿ 0:
for ￿ 1 < h < b (A.4.2)
Hence, the long-run average of h can be evaluated as E [h] =
R
￿ hf (h)dh, where ￿ depends on the distrib-






















￿2 hdh = b ￿
2￿
￿2 (A.4.3)
A.5 Long-run average growth rate of deforestation



















+ ln[J ￿ B]
where J=
￿2
￿2￿1 (r ￿ ￿)￿
PA(A)
r and J > B. Rewriting ln[J ￿ B] as ln
￿
elnJ ￿ elnB￿
and expanding it by
Taylor￿ s theorem around the point (g lnJ; g lnB) yields:












g lnB￿g lnJ +
g lnB





g lnB￿g lnJ ; v2 =
1











+ v0 + v1 lnJ + v2 lnB (A.5.2)
Now, by Ito￿ s lemma and the considerations discussed in the paper on the competitive equilibrium, ln￿
evolves according to dln￿ = v2dlnB = v2[(￿ ￿ 1
2￿2)dt + ￿dw] with ln^ ￿ as upper re￿ ecting barrier. Setting
h = ln￿, the random variable ln￿ follows a linear Brownian motion with parameter ￿ = v2(￿ ￿ 1
2￿2) > 0
and has a long-run distribution with (A.4.2) as density function.







+ v0 + v1 ln
h
￿2
￿2￿1 (r ￿ ￿)￿￿
r
i
+ v2 lnB ￿ h
￿v1
(A.5.3)









































































e J ￿ e B


















































+ v0 + v1 ln
h
￿2





























By the monotonicity property of the logarithm, e B must exists such that ln e B = g lnB. Furthermore, by
plugging e B into (10), we can always ￿nd a surface ~ A and e J =
￿2
￿2￿1 (r ￿ ￿)￿
PA( ~ A)
r such that a linearization
along (g lnB; g lnJ) is equivalent to a linearization along (ln e B;ln e J), where g lnJ = ln e J. This implies that by
setting ( e B; ~ A), the long-run average rate of deforestation can be written as:
1
dt




































￿2￿1(r￿￿)￿ + c and ~ A < ^ A.



















+ ln[K + B]
35where K=
￿1
￿1￿1 (r ￿ ￿)￿
PA(A)




Taylor￿ s theorem around the point ( g lnK; g lnB) leads to:
ln[K + B] ’ ln
h
e




lnK ￿ g lnK
1 + e
g lnB￿ g lnK +
lnB ￿ g lnB
1 + e￿( g lnB￿ g lnK)












g lnB￿ g lnK +
g lnB





g lnB￿ g lnK ; w2 =
1













+ w0 + w1 lnK + w2 lnB (A.5.5)
Also in this case, ln& evolves according to the motion dln& = w2dlnB = w2[(￿ ￿ 1
2￿2)dt + ￿dw] and
ln^ & is a re￿ ecting barrier. By setting h = ln&, ln& evolves as a linear Brownian motion with parameter
￿ = w2(￿ ￿ 1
2￿2) > 0 and (A.4.2) as density function. Then, solving (A.5.5) with respect to lnA yields the







+ w0 + w1 ln
h
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￿1￿1 (r ￿ ￿)￿￿
r
i
+ w2 lnB ￿ h
￿w1
(A.5.6)
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As shown above, having ￿xed a pair ( e B; ~ A) we can conveniently linearize along (ln e B;ln e J) where ln e B = g lnB
and g lnK = ln e K with e K=
￿1
￿1￿1 (r ￿ ￿) 1￿￿
￿2￿￿￿1
PA( ~ A)
r . This leads to the following expression for the long-run















￿1￿1 (r ￿ ￿)￿ c

















r ~ A￿￿ ￿ 1)
where
PA( ~ A)
r = c ￿
e B
￿1
￿1￿1(r￿￿)￿ and ~ A > ^ A.
A.6 The impact of uncertainty on the distribuition of ￿ (and &)
Rearranging (A.5.2) yields
ln￿ ’ U￿ + v2 lnB (A.6.1)
where U￿ = ln
￿1￿￿￿2
r￿￿ + v0 + v1 lnJ:
By some manipulations:
eln￿ = eU￿+v2 lnB
￿ = eU￿Bv2 (A.6.2)


























Calculating ￿rst, second moment and variance for ￿ we obtain:
















Note that since ￿ + 1
2(v2 ￿ 1)￿2 < 0 and v2 < 0 then E(￿) is increasing in t. Finally, by deriving V ar(￿)



















That is, as ￿ soars V ar(￿) increases and so does the probability of hitting ^ ￿ which in turn implies an increase
in the long run average deforestation rate.
37Similarly, starting from (A.5.5)
ln& ’ U& + w2 lnB (A.6.3)





+ w0 + w1 lnK, one may easily check that
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